Collective Strategy Development Essay

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John Wiley ; Sons is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Strategic Management Journal. http://www. jstor. org Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 9, 375-385 (1988) AND COMPETITIVE MATCHING COLLECTIVE RUDIK. F. BRESSER Baruch College, The City University of New York,New York,New York,U. S. A. This paper discusses possibilities for combining collective and competitive strategies. Combinations can be problematic if competitive intentions are disclosed through the information links resultingfrom collective strategies. After describing how different collective strategies may lead to an uncontrolled disclosure of strategic information, a typology evaluating the feasibility of strategy combinations is developed. The typology’s implications for research and managerial practice are discussed. A recent development in the business policy literature is a concern with strategic planning at a collective level. Collective strategies are attempts by sets of organizations to manage their mutural interdependence and the system dynamics of their interorganizational environments (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986; Thorelli, 1986). In managing interdependent and dynamic environments, collective strategies can be reactive by absorbing movement within an environment, or they can be proactive by forestalling the unpredictable behavior of other organizations. Firms can use collective strategies in combination with competitive strategies. This paper discusses the extent to which such combinations are feasible. MANAGING INTERDEPENDENCE Organizational interdependence exists whenever one organization does not entirely control all the conditions necessary for achieving a desired action or outcome (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In addition to environmental movement, interdependence can cause problems of decision-making uncertainty for focal organizations. This occurs because the success of activities chosen by any interdependent organization depends on the activities selected by other organizations. Consequently, an interdependent organization may need to consider other organizations’ actions, and it faces decision-making uncertainty if it is aware of its interdependence and has difficulties in controlling the activities of other organizations. Decision-making uncertainty is most likely to be perceived among horizontally interdependent organizations operating in oligopolistic markets. Under these conditions all organizations are aware of their mutual interdependence and have considerable difficulties in controlling each other’s behaviors as they compete with one another for market share (Fombrun and Astley, 1982; Pennings, 1981). Business firms can use both competitive and collective strategies to manage their interdependencies. The literature distinguishes three major dimensions of competitive strategies: price, promotional, and product competition strategies (Khandwalla, 1981). Competitive strategies manage interdependence successfully if they result in advantageous competitive positions, thus forestalling interdependence and reducing decisionmaking uncertainty (Pennings, 1981). For Received 20 October 1986 Revised 21 July 1987 ? 0143-2095/88/040375-11$05. 50 1988 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 376 R. K. F. Bresser Table 1. Coordination mechanisms for collective strategies Coordination mechanism Regulative legislation Contracting Mergers Joint ventures Interlocking directorates Trade associations Collusion and industry leadership Degree of formalization High High High High Moderate Moderate Low instance, product differentiation can create a protected domain for a focal organization with boundaries hard to penetrate by other competitors. However, in complex business environments interdependencies often are obscured from focal organizations so that individually coping with the dynamics of these environments becomes problematic (Emery and Trist, 1965). In these situations, collective strategies can supplement competitive strategies as a means of coping with the variation of interdependent environments (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a). CONCEPTIONS STRATEGY OF COLLECTIVE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COMPETITIVE AND COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES Bresser and Harl (1986) described the dynamic relationship between competitive and collective strategies as being composed of two strategic perspectives that are dialectically related to one another. For instance, when competitive strategies prevail within a market the resulting turbulence and decision-making uncertainty eventually will encourage organizations to use more collective forms of strategizing. However, when collective strategies prevail and create dysfunctions (such as reductions in strategic flexibility, amplified impacts of external disturbances, and attraction of innovative outsiders) which also cause environmental movement and decision-making uncertainty, competitive strategies may again be considered the more attractive methods for coping with interdependence. The dialectical relationship between competitive and collective strategies implies that organizations should remain alert to potential dysfunctions developing from their operating strategies, and that they should maintain a capacity to alternate between more collective and more competitive forms of strategizing (Bresser and Harl, 1986). However, some conflicts between competitive and collective strategies can be anticipated and should be considered before a particular strategy mix is adopted. This paper evaluates combinations between competitive and collective strategies in light of a potential conflict arising from the need to both share and conceal strategic information. Whenever organizations attempt to use both types of strategies simultaneously, i. e. competitive The term ‘collective strategy’ has been defined in two different ways (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986). On the one hand a collective strategy is defined as a larger interorganizational network which emerges unintendedly. As individual organizational actions aggregate into interorganizational networks an unintended collective strategy emerges that none of the participating organizations could have foreseen. Developments in the telecommunications industry exemplify the emergence of an unintended collective strategy (Astley and Fombrun, 1983b). On the other hand a collective strategy can also be voluntary and intended. Such a collective strategy results from the purposive collaboration of organizations attempting to manage their mutual interdependence. This paper focuses on voluntary collective strategies, developed by oligopolists to manage their horizontal interdependence. Voluntary collective strategies can be based on different coordination mechanisms. Table 1 presents these mechanisms using degree of formalization as the distinguishing criterion (Bresser and Harl, 1986; Fombrun and Astley, 1983). Regulative legislation (resulting from collective lobbying) and contracting represent coordination forms with high levels of formality. Collective strategies based on interlocking directorates or trade associations are characterized by moderate levels of formality, and collusion as well as industry leadership can be classified as informal coordination mechanisms. Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies strategies in one business area and collective strategies in others, a potential for contradictory activities or conflicts arises, because the major advantage of a collective strategy is a major disadvantage from a competitive point of view. With regard to managing interdependence the major advantage of a collective strategy is that it establishes linkages and communication channels through which information about other interdependent organizations can be obtained. Through this information the behavior of other organizations becomes predictable. This makes an environment more stable and less threatening for a focal organization, and thus reduces decision-making uncertainty (Fombrun and Astley, 1983; Pennings, 1981). Precisely this advantage of a collective strategy (stability through predictability) is a disadvantage if organizations wish to use competitive strategies to further their growth goals. Successful competitive strategies require that organizations maintain the secrecy of their strategic plans to forestall imitation (Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981). However, this need for secrecy is jeopardized if interorganizational linkages and communication channels resulting from a collective strategy allow organizations to predict and anticipate one another’s moves in areas where they wish to compete. Thus, organizations face a risk of uncontrolled information disclosure when using collective and competitive strategies side by side. Risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is defined as the likelihood that a disclosure of strategically sensitive information will occur, where the process of disclosue is uncontrolled from a focal organization’s point of view and damaging to its competitive plans. The potential damage resulting from an uncontrolled disclosure of information is particularly salient in oligopolies (the dominant US market structure) because in such markets ompetitors typically are in a position to use sensitive information to exert control over each other’s fates (Pennings, 1981; Scherer, 1980). Evaluating the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure emanating from collective strategies is important for two reasons. On the one hand, such information disclosure tends to render competitive strategic intentions ineffective. On the other hand uncontrolle d information disclosure tends to aggravate problems of strategic inflexibility. Bresser (1984) and Bresser and 377 Harl (1986) argued that organizations adopting collective strategies limit their strategic flexibility because, by agreeing to abstain from certain types of competitive behaviors such as price competition, they curtail their repertoire of available strategic tools. When considering the problem of uncontrolled information disclosure, losses in strategic flexibility resulting from a collective strategy may be even more encompassing. If the managements of organizations realize that the communication links provided by a collective strategy allow for an uncontrolled disclosure of strategic plans, they may be reluctant to pursue competitive strategies even in those business areas that are not subject to a collective agreement. PROCESSES IMPAIRING SECRECY Since potential combinations between competitive and collective strategies face the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure resulting from collective strategy links, they raise the issue of strategic fit (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). In order to minimize problems of uncontrolled information disclosure it is necessary to obtain some degree of compatability among possible strategy combinations. Attaining a fit between competitive and collective strategies requires first of all an appreciation of the processes that may impair an organization’s desire to maintain the secrecy of its strategic plans. Table 2 summarizes for each type of collective strategy the particular processes that may lead to an impairment of secrecy, and it assesses the risk of uncontrolled disclosure of information. If collective lobbying leads to protective regulation the activities of regulators may impede competition (Pennings, 1981). Regulators often collect and disseminate a wealth of information about regulated industries. Through these information flows, regulators can allow competitors to forecast each other’s moves even in areas that are not subject to regulatory control. For example, Litwak and Rothman (1970) suggested that the Federal Communications Commission had provided the broadcasting networks with so much information about the broadcasting industry that the networks were able to anticipate their competitors’ behavior and, as a result, effective competition was not possible. The autonomy of 378 R. K. F. Bresser Table 2. Processes impairing secrecy and risk of uncontrolled disclosure by type of collective strategy Type of collective strategy Impairment of secrecy Risk of uncontrolled information disclosure Regulative legislation Contracting Mergers Joint ventures Interlocking directorates Trade associations Collusion and industry leadership Regulators collecting and disseminating information Contracts contingent on information Dissatisfied employees (defectors) Mediation of information Passing on of information due to multiple and indirect communication links Distribution of trade statistics Informal communication High Low Low Intermediate High Intermediate Low regulatory agencies in their information-gathering activities results in high risk of uncontrolled disclosure. Contracting refers to the negotiation of formal agreements among organizations (Thompson, 1967). In general, the information exchanged as a result of contractual negotiations will be focused, avoiding the disclosure of sensitive competitive aspects. However, some contracts such as bank loans may require that focal organizations provide extensive information about their competitive plans. This raises the possibility that information leaks within the information-seeking institution will be exploited by a focal organization’s competitors. Since he disclosure of sensitive information in the context of contractual negotiations is not very common, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure can be considered low. Mergers and joint ventures are two special forms of contracting. Mergers, with the exception of hostile takeovers, are contracts through which two or more organizations comneunder common control. Joint ventures can be viewed as partial mergers which preserve the autonomy of the org anizations involved. Often mergers are accompanied by a host of administrative problems (Lubatkin, 1983). For example, departments and operations must be consolidated and initial inequities in compensation have to be resolved. If such administrative problems remain unresolved, inefficiencies will result, as well as employee dissatisfaction and turnover. The merger between Kennecott Corp. and Carborundum Co. is a case in point (Business Week, 1983). The two companies’ managements quarreled over administrative problems and, after a short period of infighting, most Carborundum executives jumped ship. There is danger that defecting executives may disclose strategically sensitive information concerning the merging firms when they join other organizations within the same industry. However, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure resulting from a merger is considered low. This is because senior executives leaving merging firms often receive generous severance compensation for which they promise continued confidentiality. Additionally, since merging firms often develop new strategic concepts, the information available to departing executives is likely to be quickly obsolete. If a collective strategy is based on a joint venture the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is considered to be at intermediate levels. Although the cooperation provided by a joint venture is restricted to specific, mutual business problems, the regularity and longevity of interactions typical of a joint venture may allow participating firms to improve their intelligence about each other’s competitive strategies. For example, firm representatives engaged in joint ventures can develop friendship ties where they feel free to discuss more general strategic issues. During such discussions sensitive information may be disclosed inadvertently. Interlocking directorates result from organizational co-optation activities whereby organizations appoint external representatives to their Matching Collective and Comnpetitive Strategies boards of directors. Since many directors sit on the boards of two or more companies (Bunting and Barbour, 1971), interlocking directorates emerge which can be used as instruments for managing interdependence and uncertainty by encouiraging cooperation and the formation of collective strategies (Aldrich, 1979; Pennings, 1980, 1981). However, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is high because the scope and the intensity of intra-industry communication facilitated by direct and indirect interlocks is beyond the control of individual organizations. Therefore, it is very difficult for individual organizations to conceal their competitive strategies when their directors have membership in a network of interlocking directorates. Trade associations provide member organizations with special services at low costs. For instance, they may distribute trade statistics, provide credit references on customers, offer legal and technical advice, or help collect bills (Olson, 1965). In addition, associations can aid in removing decision-making uncertainty resulting from interdependence. Since trade statistics generally include prices quoted in recent sales transactions as well as cost developments, member organizations have the opportunity to coordinate their market behavior and thus implement a collective strategy (Scherer, 1980). The dissemination of statistical information provided by trade associations may impair the desire of focal organizations to maintain secrecy their competitive strategies. While firms regiarding are often in favor of price and cost reporting activities, they run the risk that other sensitive information concerning their competitive strategies may also be disclosed. Trade associations sometimes analyze industry trends regarding product development or marketing strategies, and thus allow competitors to anticipate each others’ moves. A focal organization may have little control over the kind of information being disseminated because trade associations are often dominated by a few powerful organizations. Olson (1965) described the National Association of Manufacturers as largely financed and controlled by a few big corporations, although the association had several thousand members. There is the possibility that such domination leads to activities favoring a handful of member organizations rather than the majority. In addition, the selective services provided by 379 ssociations function as subtle forms of coercion restricting a firm’s flexibility. The exclusivity and low costs of legal, financial or other services operate as strong incentives for joining or remaining within an association even if a focal organization disagrees with some association activities. Thus, when using trade association activities to enforce a collective strategy, a moderate risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is likely. The term collusion denotes express agreements, open or secret, that have the purpose of restricting competition. Most collusive agreements are outlawed in the United States because they encourage monopolistic pricing behavior. Nevertheless, collusive practices are widespread and often effective means of managing interdependence. Their attraction is associated with their high degree of informality which makes it difficult for outsiders to detect conspiratorial agreements (Khandwalla, 1981). Industry leadership is a tacit version of collusion based on imitation. It describes a situation where a specific firm is the acknowledged leader in setting prices, and other firms follow. As opposed to collusive agreements, industry leadership has the advantage of not being contrary to the antitrust laws. It is considered legal as long as it is grounded on voluntary imitation rather than explicit communication (White, 1981). Since collective strategies mediated by collusive agreements are based on informal communication and, in the case of industry leadership, on imitation, the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is low. Colluding firms will share information only in areas where they wish to cooperate while maintaining the secrecy of their competitive plans. The above risk assessments imply that uncontrolled information disclosure is always damaging for the success of a focal organization’s competitive plans. While the dynamics of oligopolistic markets would tend to support this assumption (Scherer, 1980), the degree of damage resulting from uncontrolled disclosure can be viewed as contingent upon several situational variables. Specifically, four situational variables appear important: breadth of information disclosure, quality of information disclosure, asymmetry in interdependence, and event control. These situational variables can facilitate the combination of a ‘high-risk’ collective strategy with competitive strategies, and they can make the adoption of a 380 Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies dimensions. This is relevant for evaluating strategy combinations because an uncontrolled disclosure of information is less troublesome if competitors are unable to capitalize on the information due to their inability to respond rapidly to a focal organization’s competitive moves. Table 3 presents a typology of possible combinations between competitive and collective strategies, and evaluates their feasibility from the perspective of individual firms. Generally, a strategy combination is considered feasible if (1) the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is low. Feasibility evaluations also take into account (2) the degree of competitor responsiveness typical for a competitive dimension, and (3) typical characteristics of specific collective strategies, namely the number of participants involved and the stability of an agreement. Considering typical characteristics of collective strategies is important because such characteristics can modify feasibility ratings that are based on assessments of the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure and the level of competitor responsiveness. Situational variables, described above, may mediate the damage resulting from uncontrolled information disclosure but do not lend themselves to generalizations and therefore are excluded from considerations leading to the typology shown in Table 3. However, in using the typology, situational variables will have to be taken into account, as is shown in the implications section. In Table 3 the competitive dimensions pricing, advertising and promotion, and product innovation are distinguished for each of the seven collective strategies summarized in Tables 1 and 2. Within each of these competitive dimensions, organizations can relate to each other by using either competitive or collective strategies. Thus, six strategy combinations are possible for each type of collective strategy,’ leading to a total of 42 combinations presented in Table 3. I Since only two values are possible within each competitive dimension, and since the extreme cases (competitive or collective strategies across all competitive dimensions) are irrelevant as they do not represent combinations of collective and competitive strategies, the total number of strategy combinations C for each type of collective strategy can be calculated by collective strategy with low or moderate risks of uncontrolled disclosure problematic. For example, the potential damage resulting from uncontrolled disclosure may be considered low, and thus can facilitate the adoption of a collective strategy where the risk of uncontrolled disclosure is high, when the competitive information that could be disclosed is not very encompassing (breadth of information disclosure), or of questionable quality regarding its reliability and/or timeliness (Adams, 1976; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Similarly, if interdependence is asymmetric, with some organizations being in a relatively powerful competitive position (e. . due to their size), uncontrolled information disclosure may not be very troublesome for these powerful organizations because they know that other competitors lack the resources to exploit the disclosed information (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Likewise, damage may be low and containable, if organizations can rapidly and effectively counteract events leading to uncontrolled information disclosure, for example, by changing perso nnel or the content of a collective strategy (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Implications for evaluating the feasibility of strategy combinations resulting from the role of situational variables are discussed below. COMBINATIONS OF COMPETITIVE AND COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES Apart from an understanding of how collective strategies can lead to uncontrolled information disclosure, an assessment of what types of combinations between competitive and collective strategies are feasible requires that different competitive strategies also be distinguished. Three distinguishing dimensions of competitive strategies are pricing, advertising and promotion, and product innovation (Khandwalla, 1981). These dimensions can be classified according to their degree of ‘competitor responsiveness’ (Ansoff, 1984). The term competitor responsiveness refers to the speed with which competitors can respond to variations in competitive conditions. While price cuts usually can be matched instantly, it takes much longer to organize retaliations to a heavy advertising campaign, and even longer to respond to product innovations (Khandwalla, 1981; Scherer, 1980). Thus competitor responsiveness decreases along these three competitive C = (2†³1- 2) where d is the number of competitive dimensions considered. For d=-3 dimensions the number of possible strategy combinations is C=6. R. K. F. Bresser Table 3. Combinations of competitive and collective strategies and their feasibility Dimensions of competition Types of strategy Pricing combinations 1. 1 1. 2 1. 3 1. 4 1. 5 1. 6 2. 1 2. 2 2. 3 2. 4 2. 5 2. 6 3. 1 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4 3. 5 3. 6 4. 1 4. 2 4. 3 4. 4 4. 5 4. 6 5. 1 5. 2 5. 3 5. 4 5. 5 5. 6 6. 1 6. 2 6. 3 6. 4 6. 5 6. 6 7. 1 7. 2 7. 3 7. 4 7. 5 7. IL Competition Regulation Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Contracting Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Merger Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Joint Venture Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Interlocks Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Trade Association Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Collusion/IL Collusio n/IL Competition Collusion/IL Competition Advertising and promotion Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Regulation Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Contracting Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Merger Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Joint Venture Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Interlocks Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Trade Association Collusion/IL Competition Collusion/IL Competition Competition Collusion/IL 381 Product innovation Regulation Regulation Competition Regulation Competition Competition Contracting Contracting Competition Contracting Competition Competition Merger Merger Competition Merger Competition Competition Joint Venture Joint Venture Competition Joint Venture Competition Competition Interlocks Interlocks Competition Interlocks Competition Competition Trade Association Trade Association Competition Trade Association Competition Competition Collusion/IL Collusion/IL Competition Collusion/IL Competition Competition Feasibility of strategy combination Low Low Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate High High High High High High High High High High High Intermediate Intermediate High High High High Low Low Low Low Low Low Low Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Industryleadership The first group of (six) strategy combinations uses competition in one or two competitive dimensions in conjunction with regulation as the basis for enforcing a collective strategy. The feasibility of all six combinations is rated either at low or intermediate levels. The first two combinations (1. 1 and 1. 2) have a low feasibility rating. If organizations use regulation to harmonize their promotional and product innovation activities, and have competitive flexibility in the area of pricing (combination 1. 1), their chances of competing successfully are slim. This is because 382 R. K. F. Bresser an industry may remain intense. In fact, often firms merge to obtain strategic advantages in the areas of price competition, promotion or product innovation wlhich may increase rather than decrease competitive interactions. When joint ventures serve as mechanisms to enforce collective strategies, feasibility ratings for strategy combinations are similarly favorable. This form of collective strategizing also tends to involve only a few organizations, allowing for competition within a particular area in spite of joint venture activity. fHowever, joint ventures carry a higher risk of uncontrolled information disclosure than contracting or mergers. Thus cautious feasibility evaluations seem appropriate when a focal organization engages in joint ventures in more than one comnpetitivearea, and when the only competitive dimension not subject to collective coordination is characterized by relatively high levels of competitor responsiveness (combinations 4. 1 and 4. 2). In these situations the relatively high number of information links among firms participating in several joint ventures multiplies the risk and potential damage of uncontrolled disclosure. If organizations choose interlocking directorates to coordinate intra-industry activity, they constantly run a high risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. Co-opted directors may intentionally or inadvertently, directly or indirectly, pass on sensitive information to a focal organization’s competitors. Thus, relying on interlocks to enforce collective strategies while simultaneously attempting to maintain some competitive flexibility does not appear feasible. The predominant feasibility rating assigned to the group of strategy combinations using trade associations as a means to develop collective strategies is ‘intermediate’. Although experience demonstrates that the coordination provided by trade associations mostly does not go beyond price and cost reporting (Scherer, 1980), the possibility of trade associations collecting and reporting other sensitive information is always acute. Often individual organizations cannot oppose such uncontrolled reporting of industry developments, especially if the association is dominated by a few powerful corporations. If trade associations do not engage in price reporting, but are used to develop collective strategies in the areas of advertising and promotion, and product innovation (combination 6. 1), a low uick competitor responsiveness can be expected with respect to the pricing dimension, and regulators are likely to disclose sensitive information concerning advertising and innovations. A similar argument applies to combination 1. 2, where competitive conditions exist only with regard to advertising and promotion, a dimension characterized by intermediate levels of competitor responsiveness. Since competitors usually need considerable time to respond to product innovations, combination 1. 3 (with regulation in the other two dimensions) is not quite as problematic as the first two combinations. However, the distinct possibility of uncontrolled information disclosure through regulator activities makes combination 1. 3 feasible only at an intermediate level. Combinations 1. 4 through 1. allow for competition in at least two dimensions. While these combinations provide organizations with a larger arsenal of competitive tools than the first three combinations, they also are considered feasible only at intermediate levels because of the risk of uncontrolled disclosure through regulators. The feasibility of strategy combinations involving contracting as a form of collect ive strategizing generally is considered high because the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure tends to be low. In addition, often (and in contrast to regulation) only few organizations participate in a particular contractual agreement, thus limiting the extent to which competition is constrained. If, within an industry of say eight oligopolists, three contract to standardize product designs, competition with the remaining five oligopolists in the area of product innovations is still possible and likely. The only strategy combination where a less favorable (intermediate) feasibility rating is assigned is combination 2. 1. If extensive contracting in the areas of advertising/promotion and product innovation has considerably lowered the participating firms’ strategic flexibility, relying on price competition as the sole competitive tool does not appear sensible. Price competition is likely to face a high degree of competitor responsiveness. The third group of strategy combinations, using merger activity to realize collective strategies, has high feasibility ratings throughout. The risk of uncontrolled information disclosure is low, and the number of firms involved in a merger is usually quite small, so that competition within Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies feasibility rating seems appropriate. Again, in this situation firms would maintain competition only in an area where high competitor responsiveness is likely. Combinations of competitive and collective strategies using the various forms of collusion and industry leadership are not as problem-free as the risk evaluation in Table 2 might suggest. Although collusive agreements are not burdened with the problem of uncontrolled information disclosure, their combination with competitive strategies appears feasible at an intermediate level at best. Since collusive agreements are informal and difficult to enforce, individual firmns have a strong incentive to chisel-that is to increase their profits by secretly deviating from the agreement (Stigler, 1964). Secret deviations cannot be concealed for long periods of time, and frequently result in collusive conspiracies breaking down and touching off bitter rivalries such as price wars (Scherer, 1980; Weiss, 1961). It is likely that the tendency of collusive agreements towards breakdown will be aggravated if colluding organizations decide to compete in some competitive areas rather than displaying ‘gentlemanly’, non-competitive behavior across all competitive dimensions. A firm’s successful competitive behavior in one area will encourage less successful firms to chisel in other areas that are subject to collusive coordination. Thus combinations of competitive and collective strategies can be expected to be volatile when collusion serves as a means for enforcing collective strategies. This volatility results from the particular characteristics of collusive agreements, and exists regardless of the risk for uncontrolled information disclosure or the level of competitor responsiveness. 383 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS This paper extends the literature advocating the development of voluntary collective strategies as means to manage environmental turbulence and interdependence (Astley and Fombrun, 1983a; Bresser and Harl, 1986). It assesses the possibilities of combining competitive with collective strategies from the perspective of individual organizations. Such combinations may be problematic because an organization’s ability to maintain the secrecy of competitive strategic plans may be jeopardized by information links established through different forms of collective strategy (Fornbrun and Astley, 1983a; Starbuck and Nystrom, 1981). After discussing how collective strategies may lead to an uncontrolled disclosure of strategically sensitive information, combinations of competitive and collective strategies are classified according to their varying degrees of feasibility. A comparison of the ratings presented in Tables 2 and 3 makes apparent that the feasibility of strategy combination tends to be inversely related to the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. If the risk and the feasibility ratings are expressed numerically with the values of ‘low’ equaling 1, ‘intermediate’ equaling 2, and ‘high’ equaling 3, a correlation coefficient can be calculated on the basis of all 42 strategy combinations. The resulting coefficient is r = -0. 70, indicating that within the present classification scheme about 50 percent of the variance in feasibility evaluations is accounted for by the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure. However, high risks of uncontrolled disclosure do not generally lead to low feasibility ratings, and low risks do not necessarily imply high feasibility scores , as is demonstrated by the combinations involving collective strategies based on regulation and collusion respectively. The unexplained variation in feasibility ratings suggests additional factors are important in assessing the feasibility of strategy combinations, notably the degree of competitor responsiveness and the particular characteristics of the type of collective strategy employed. Further variation in feasibility ratings can be expected when situational variables such as breadth and quality of information disclosure, asymmetry in interdependence, and event control are considered (Adams, 1976; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). This is so because these situational variables can contain or amplify the potential damage resulting from uncontrolled infornmationdisclosure. While situational variables were not considered in the development of this paper’s typology of strategy combinations, they have implications both for research and managerial decision-making that can originate from the typological classification given in Table 3. The existence of situational variables highlights a feature common to all typologies or organi- 384 R. K. F. Bresser information disclosure is of little relevance? 7. How rapidly and effectively can events of uncontrolled information disclosure be counteracted? Answers to these and similar questions can help executives to apply the information provided by Table 3 situationally before adopting a specific combination of collective and competitive strategies. From this process the selection of compatible strategies should result. This paper’s discussion has concentrated on oligopolistic markets because, typically, in such markets competitors are aware of their mutual interdependence, have incomplete control of each other’s moves, and yet the success of each oligopolist’s strategic intentions depends considerably on the activities chosen by other competitors (Pennings, 1981). Obviously, within such a context, the damage resulting from an uncontrolled disclosure of sensitive information is potentially high. While the theory of oligopoly has been developed mainly for domestic, nondiversified enterprise (Stigler, 1964), the issues and ideas discussed in this paper can also be of relevance to multinational and diversified corporations. Due to the dominance of oligopolies, both multinational and diversified firms will often find themselves operating in different national or regional oligopolies. Additionally, managing a match between collective and competitive strategies may be more difficult in interindustry and international arenas than in intraindustry environments because the number of interdependent segments representing a particular coporation’s domain is larger and more complex (Bresser and Harl, 1986; Hawkins and Walter, 1981). Thus, anticipating factors such as the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure and the potential damage resulting from such disclosure may be even more important for multinational and diversified firms than for domestic oligopolists. zational phenomena. Classifications of the type developed in Table 3 are ideal types, based on generalizations derived from common knowledge and common sense (Blau and Scott, 1962; Pugh, Hickson and Hinings, 1969). However, the strategy combinations distinguished represent 42 separate hypotheses regarding the opportunities and risks organizations might encounter when utilizing competitive and collective strategies side by side. The accuracy of any particular feasibility evaluation is an empirical question open to resolution through historical research, where the mediating role of situational variables has to be included in the research design. From a managerial point of view a typology of strategy combinations with varying levels of feasibility can aid in strategic decision-making. The strategic options evaluated in Table 3 can serve as a guide to managers considering a particular strategy combination. In attempting to extrapolate easibility evaluations, decisionmakers would have to assess whether the variables leading to the feasibility ratings shown in Table 3 are of the assumed magnitude, and to what extent deviations would lead to different feasibility assessments. In addition, decision-mak ers would have to evaluate the extent to which situational variables require changes in feasibility ratings. For example, a firm intending to implement a strategy mix similar to combination 4. 3 would have to consider the following questions before deciding whether the feasibility of such a combination is high: 1. Is the risk of uncontrolled information disclosure resulting from the planned joint venture activity really at moderate levels, and how can it be contained? 2. Is there really a low degree of competitor responsiveness to product innovations within this industry? 3. Is competitive flexibility in pricing and promotional strategies maintained in spite of joint venture activity within these competitive dimensions? 4. How encompassing is the information that could get disclosed? 5. How reliable and timely is the information that competitors could obtain? 6. Does asymmetrical interdependence typical for this industry favor our firm so that REFERENCES Adams, J. S. ‘The structure and dynamics of behavior in organizational boundary roles’. In Dunette, M. (ed. ), Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1175-1199. Rand McNally, Chicago, 1976, pp. Matching Collective and Competitive Strategies Aldrich, H. E. Organizations and Environment, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1979. Ansoff, H. I. Implanting Strategic Management, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1984. Astley, W. G. and C. J. Fombrun. ‘Collective strategy: social ecology of organizational environments’, Academy of Management Review, 8, 1983a, pp. 576-587. Astley, W. G. and C. J. Fombrun. ‘Technological innovation and industrial structure: the case of telecommunications. In Lamb, R. (ed. ), Advances in Strategic Management, vol. 1, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1983b, pp. 205-229. Blau, P. M. and W. R. Scott. Formal Organizations, Chandler, San Francisco, 1962. 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Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 253-267. Khandwalla, P. N. ‘Properties of competing organizations’. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 409-432. Litwak, E. and J. Rothman. ‘Towards the theory and practice of coordination between formal organizations’. In Rosengren, W. R. and M. Lefton (eds), Organizations and Clients: Essays in the Sociology 385 of Service, Merrill, Columbus, OH, 1970, pp. 137-186. Lubatkin, M. ‘Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firms’, Academy of Management Review, 8, 1983, pp. 218-225. Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1965. Pennings, J. M. Interlocking Directorates, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1980. Pennings, J. M. ‘Strategically interdependent organizations’. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 434-455. Pfeffer, J. and C. R. Salancik. The External Control of Organizations, Harper and Rowe, New York, 1978. Pugh, D. S. , D. J. Hickson and C. R. Hinings. ‘An empirical taxonomy of structures of work organizations’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 14, 1969, pp. 115-126. Scherer, F. M. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd edn, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1980. Smart, C. and I. Vertinsky, ‘Designs for crisis decision units’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 22, 1977, pp. 640-657. Starbuck, W. H. and P. C. Nystrom. ‘Designing and understanding organizations’. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. ix-xxii. Stigler, G. J. A theory of oligopoly’, Journal of Political Economy, 72, 1964, pp. 44-61. Thompson, J. D. Organizations in Action, McGrawHill, New York, 1967. Thorelli, H. B. ‘Networks: between markets and hierarchies’, Strategic ManagementJouirnal,7, 1986, pp. 37-51. Venkatraman, N. and J. C. Camillus. ‘Exploring the concept of â€Å"fit† in strategic management’, Academy of Management Review, 9, 1984, pp. 513-525. Weiss, L. W. Economics and American Industry, John Wiley, New York, 1961. White, L. J. ‘How organizations use exchange media and agreements’. In Nystrom, P. C. and W. H. Starbuck (eds), Handbook of Organizational Design, vol. 2, Oxford University Press, New York, 1981, pp. 440-453.

QR Codes Being Used For Marketing Essay

For the purposes of this assignment, a QR code for Coca-Cola was used. The image scanned is to the right. This is a QR Code Coca-Cola places throughout sports websites including ESPN.COM which is where this was found. Analysis of the QR Code’s Effectiveness Having found the image on ESPN.COM it was assumed that the next jump point would be to one of their sports drink brands. In fact the QR Code took me to their Facebook fan page and asked me to â€Å"Like† their page. The page has 58.6 million likes and shows friends who are also â€Å"Liked† the brand. As the landing page was the Facebook fan page for the brand, the call to action was to review and look over their content. As the Super Bowl was just last weekend and Coca-Cola had a series of commercials running at this event, there are pictures, out-takes and other items that show how the commercials were made. There is also a series of videos that are used for further supporting and promoting their brand. The Coca-Cola brand page is one of the more comprehensive in consumer advertising with exceptionally rich, varied international content. There is no overt call to action to buy one of their beverages; there is however an exceptional depth to the history of the brand and its progression over time. Coca-Cola is clearly proud of their history in advertising and branding, and use the Facebook timeline to show this well. They have also shown on their Facebook fan page how to create a community extremely well. The continued efforts on the part of Facebook to create communities and show how Coca-Cola fans all share common bounds together is done well. Conclusion Coca-Cola is maintaining and strengthening its brand with this QR code campaign. It is also showcasing how well it integrates the many channels of customer interaction and communication with its social media efforts. The area Coca-Cola needs to improve on however is the placement of this specific QR code. It was on a sports website which have one assume it was for a sports drink. The branding for sports on the Facebook site used as the landing page was so generic to sports, it was more like a billboard. This QR campaign was designed for a very broad, global audience and for that purpose, did extremely well. It could have been improved through the use of more effective, segmented QR codes to specific Coca-Cola sites dedicated to specific interests. Finally, the call to action was vague and more based on building awareness. What Coca-Cola did well however was create a very effective program for driving people to their Facebook page immediately, driving up Likes. Coca-Cola’s branding is predicated on a spread message of refreshment, and they did accomplish this very well. Finally the company did a great job of showing how it has created entertaining commercials and promotions based on their innate expertise in consumer products branding.

Personal Ethics Statement Essay

My personal ethics statement includes my values and ideas important to me as an academic and in everyday life. My ethics are personal and define who I am as a person. The decisions and choices I make every day should be consistent with integrity and respect toward others. These ethics will ensure any happiness and peace as I hold these values. I believe everyone should be equal. Treating people with respect while holding myself accountable will ensure I treat people as I want to be treated. My preferred ethical len is the unrealistic role either on me or by other means that I need to pay close attention to my expectations of others. My expectations may not be the same as others. I must keep in mind that I can’t control ever situation. And that other people are capable of resolving problems. Trusting other people’s choices and decisions will help overcome this blind spot. My strength include courage in the face of obstacles. I can avoid fast decisions and at the same tim e face anything difficult. I value friendship and keep close connection with people I trust. I appreciate those who work along by my side and help to encourage me. My weakness include entitlement, hardness of heart and confusion. Believing that I am entitled to special prividges and persuade others. Hardness of heart come from expriece of people. I must practice mindfulness not to be confused. Identifying my weakness is important it allows for improvement. My value define me and my behavior or who I am. My behavior also affect others in relationships either casual or professional. The choices I make and behavior reflect me. My personal ethics determine my course of actions allowing me to see clear. Exploring and digging deep into my own emotions will allow me to my decision I make. Keeping an open and honest heart in all situations and reexamining my ethics will allow for improvement and corrections. I believe these things will help me keep focus and make better decisions and improve my life.

Deviance and Social Control

Deviance and Social Control Final Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for SOCL 101 Sociology By Social control is techniques and strategies used for preventing deviant human behavior in any society. All levels of society such as family, school, bureaucratic and government has some form of social control. Examples of family social control include obeying your parents rules, doing your homework and chores. School includes standards they expect of students such as being on time, completing assignments and following school ground rules.The bureaucratic organization emphasizes the rules and procedures among their workers. The government expresses social control through law enforcement and other formal sanctions. There are positive sanctions such as rewards for obedience and there are negative sanctions such as penalties for disobedience. Positive sanctions can include a pleasant smile of approval or range to a ceremony of honor. Negative sanctions include informal p enalties such as fear, ridicule, sarcasm and even criticism or formal penalties such as law enforcement, jail sentences, and fines. Conformity and obedience are two areas recognized for studying social control.Conformity means to go along with peers or individuals of our own status with the tendency to change our perceptions, opinions, or behavior in ways that are accepted by the group’s norms. Factors relating to conformity include areas such as size of the group, age differences, gender differences and cultural differences. On the other hand obedience, which is compliance with higher authority, can have an impact on social control as well. Factors relating to obedience include complying with authority figures, the feeling of personal responsibility, and the escalation of harm.With awareness of these factors the more likely someone is to conform along with their peers and obey authority. Sanctions are used to encourage conformity and obedience and are carried out through inf ormal and formal social control. Informal social control is carried out casually by ordinary people to enforce norms through laughter, smile, and ridicule. Formal social control is used to enforce norms through authorized agents such as police officers, judges, school administrators, and employers. Some laws, which are government social control, have been created due to society’s norms being important to people’s behavior.For example the prohibition against murder is a law among every member of society. Whereas fishing and hunting regulations are a law among those specific groups. Our textbook points out that sociologist see the creation of laws as a social process because these laws are not passed from one generation to another, but are evolving from continuous change in society of what is right and what is wrong. Society has accepted and followed these laws not because of peer group or authority figure but by means of belonging or even the fear of being viewed as dif ferent or deviant.In a sense we want to see ourselves and others to see us as loyal, cooperative, and respectful of others. Control theory is a view of conformity and deviance that stresses the social bond between society and individuals. Deviant acts, which violate social norms, may appear attractive to individuals but the social bond is used to help individuals from going toward those attractive deviant acts because of the fear of not belonging. A weak bond between society and an individual may actually push that individual toward a deviant act that he/she can benefit from.As explained by Peter Wickman (2009), â€Å"Deviance is behavior that violates the standards of conduct or expectations of a group or society† (p. 160). There are different degrees of deviance we all experience here in the United States. On one end of the spectrum there are accepted forms of deviance, like being late to a meeting, or texting while driving. On the other end of the spectrum there is crimina l deviance, dog fighting, robbery, and possession of drugs are a few examples. However, the one thing that all deviant behavior has in common is it is all defined within a particular society and at a particular time.Deviant behavior is socially constructed with the people in power defining what is expectable and what is deviant. An example of deviance here in the United States can be found in our freedom of religion. Our society was created with a strong Christian background; attending church on Sundays is widely accepted and practiced among many of our citizens. Conversely, state that you’re a satanic worshiper and you will most definitely carry a social stigma. There are other forms of deviant behavior that people can unwillingly acquire through a social stigma.Being overweight can carry a stigma within our society because overweight people are assumed to be weak in character. Being grossly unattractive can also carry an unwanted social stigma. Social deviance is subject to different social interpretations and varies throughout different cultures. What is considered deviant in one culture may be considered normal in another. Dog fighting is an example of contrasting social deviance between the USA and Afghanistan. Getting caught dog fighting in the United States and you will be thrown in jail and carry a social stigma for the rest of your life.The professional footballer Michael Vick is an example of this negative stigma. Conversely, dog fighting in Afghanistan is widely accepted and practiced every Friday morning (The Scoop, 2002). Oddly enough this was not always the case. When the Taliban was in control there were strict punishments for men who were caught fighting dogs. The Taliban encouraged sports like football, cricket, and martial arts in lieu of dog fighting. This is an example of how deviant behavior can be constructed by the people in power and how deviance can shift from one social era to another.Deviance is a complicated subject. It can b e widely accepted or rejected within a society, and will change over time. Throughout my life I have witnessed many forms of once deviant behavior becoming more and more accepted. I believe there are two primary reasons behind this shift. The first is Colorado Springs becoming a larger more populated city and the second is the mass media. When we think of the sociological perspective on deviance some people don’t even know what deviance means. Everyone has seen some type of deviance in an informal way or formal sense.Society looks at people in a way that everyone should be the same. A person that has a lot of tattoos and piercing would get looked at that they are a bad person just because the way they look. Image, sexual act, and sexual orientation are a few ways that some cultures and people look to define deviance. Functionalist perspective is one key look into deviance. Durkheim focused on the study of crime. He believed that punishment within culture would help define nor mal behavior. The way he looked at things was in a way that he thought things could get fixed.While reading this I believe everyone has their own way to express themselves no matter what culture they were raised in. The look into the functionalist perspective has a lot to do with the perspective of the people and how they look at things. Internactionist perspective explains why rule violations accrue and how people fight from conforming. They state that by not following rules, which are set by certain people, that you are a deviant. There are so many rules out there. Cultural transmission is or stated by the ethnic group or race groups.When you are in school you tend to hang out with your ethic group or race because it’s where you fit in. Like when you see graffiti some people think it is a disgrace to the environment others think of it as art. Like when I look at graffiti I don’t look at it as bad, it’s an art and a talent. We all learn how to act by what socia l groups we are in or what we see. Everyone has their own perspective there is nothing we can do about that. We look at street racers as being deviant because they race. Race car drivers do the same things just in another place other than street.So why do street racers get looked at differently? That doesn’t make sense. Trying to maintain social control is what they try to keep in order. There are main roles in life such as police that try to control or enforce the rules of the world. Then you got teachers, doctors, lawyers, and other court officials that all try to keep the world one way. In this sense they all try to pick out your looks, deviant in their eyes. By social profiling was a way they were trying to pick out who they thought was doing badly. Now looking at sexual deviance or sexual orientation people believe it should be one way and only one way.The way society looks at it as you should be man and women. And sex should only be done one way. Also what is looked at as being sexual crime there are things that some people think that is against sex code such as bondage? They think it is a crime but some people like that. There are so many things in this world that people see as deviant but really isn’t. Conflict theory defines how there are lawsuits against or towards gambling, drugs and etc. Some cultures look at gambling as a past time but the law looks at it being bad. Why should the way we were raised or how we were brought up by against us.The justice system is and will always judge against us. While looking and reading on deviants everyone is deviant in some way, shape or form. I know that I am looked at as being deviant. There are many out there that will always judge. Also by reading this opens my eyes to how things really work. Why should there be social norms on society. This is all on the perspective view of others. In Sociology, crime is identified as a deviant behavior. It is deviant in that it goes against accepted or written rules and laws that guide a society.To understand crime and sociology, one must first understand the â€Å"Conflict Theory† founded by Karl Marx. Conflict theory sees society as two struggling groups engaged in conflict over resources. Under this theory, it is believed that the capitalist class (or the society elites) commits acts of deviance just as the working class does. The main difference is that society elites determine the rules regarding what is deviant. This difference among the people will always lead to conflict. This idea explains why there is crime in societies and why it will never cease to be.Sociologists classify crimes by three types: crimes against a person, crimes against property, and victimless crimes. Crimes against a person include any offenses where violence is used or threatened. Mugging and assault are examples of crimes against a person. Crimes against property include theft of property or damage done to someone else's property. Burglary and arson are crimes against property. Finally, victimless crimes are crimes that are against the law, but no victim exists. Prostitution and marijuana are common examples of victimless crimes. In sociology, all crimes fall into one of these three categories.A victimless crime is a term used to refer to actions that have been ruled illegal but do not directly violate or threaten the rights of another individual. It often involves consensual acts in which two or more persons agree to commit a criminal offence in which no other person is involved. For example, in the United States current victimless crimes include prostitution, gambling, and illicit drug use. The term â€Å"victimless crime† is not used in jurisprudence, but is used to cast doubt onto the efficacy of existing and proposed legislation; or to highlight the unintended consequences of the same.In politics, for example, a lobbyist might use this word with the implication that the law in question should be abolished. Victimles s crimes are not always so weighty. Some examples of low level victimless activities that may be criminalized include: * individual purchase and consumption of recreational drugs (provided one does not hurt anyone else due to the effects) * prostitution and/or soliciting for prostitution * public nudity or fornication * the consumption of pornography Crimes committed by persons for whom criminally punishable acts are a permanent occupation and the primary source of money.Persons who engage in professional crime have the skills and means necessary for criminal activity and specialize in some particular type of crime, such as theft or buying and selling of stolen goods. Professional crime has its own psychology and customs, but many times professional crimes tie in with organized crime. Organized crime is transnational, national, or local groupings of highly centralized enterprises run by criminals for the purpose of engaging in illegal activity, most commonly for monetary profit.Some times criminal organizations force people to do business with them, as when a gang extorts money from shopkeepers for â€Å"protection†. Gangs may become â€Å"disciplined† enough to be considered â€Å"organized†. An organized gang or criminal set can also be referred to as a mob. In the United States the Organized Crime Control Act (1970) defines organized crime as â€Å"The unlawful activities of a highly organized, disciplined association†. Criminal activity as a structured group is referred to as racketeering and such crime is commonly referred to as the work of the Mob.In addition, due to the escalating violence of Mexico's drug war, the Mexican drug cartels are considered the ‘greatest organized crime threat to the United States', according to a report issued by the United States Department of Justice. White-collar crime is a financially motivated, non-violent crime committed for monetary gain. Within the field of criminology, white-collar cr ime initially was defined by Edwin Sutherland in 1939 as â€Å"a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation† (1939).Sutherland was a proponent of Symbolic Interactionism, and believed that criminal behavior was learned from interpersonal interaction with others. The term white-collar crime only dates back to 1939. Professor Edwin Hardin Sutherland was the first to coin the term, and hypothesize white-collar criminals attributed different characteristics and motives than typical street criminals. Sutherland defined his idea as â€Å"crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation. The introduction of white-collar crime was a relatively new issue to criminology at that time.He was urging other criminologists to stop focusing on the socially and economically disadvantaged. The types of individuals who committed these crimes lived successfully and were respected by soci ety in general-also criminologists; because these criminals were held to such a high regard, these individuals were given a blind eye to the crimes they committed. Our group choose this chapter ‘Deviance and Social Control’ to share with you all today, because we feel everyone can relate to the sociologists’ perspective regarding social control, deviance, and crime.We have learned law and society play an important role in social control, deviant acts to one person may in fact be part of another person’s culture, and crime has many different categories such as victimless crime, professional crime, and organized crime that all have formal penalties that are enforce by governmental authority. References * http://willapse. hubpages. com/hub/Thailand-Health–Safety-and-Risks-2-Crime * http://encyclopedia2. thefreedictionary. com/Professional+Crime * Attenborough, F. L. ed. and trans. ) (1922). The Laws of the Earliest English Kings. Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity Press. Reprint March 2006. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-583-1 * Schaefer, R. T. (2009). Sociology: A Brief Introduction. (8th ed. Pp. 160-163). New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. * One good reason why dogs miss the Taliban. (2002), The Scoop. Canine Nation. Retrieved from http://dogsinthenews. com/issues/0201/articles/020124a. htm * http://www. youtube. com/watch? v=GHuI2JIPylk&feature=related Deviance and Social Control Deviance and Social Control Final Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for SOCL 101 Sociology By Social control is techniques and strategies used for preventing deviant human behavior in any society. All levels of society such as family, school, bureaucratic and government has some form of social control. Examples of family social control include obeying your parents rules, doing your homework and chores. School includes standards they expect of students such as being on time, completing assignments and following school ground rules.The bureaucratic organization emphasizes the rules and procedures among their workers. The government expresses social control through law enforcement and other formal sanctions. There are positive sanctions such as rewards for obedience and there are negative sanctions such as penalties for disobedience. Positive sanctions can include a pleasant smile of approval or range to a ceremony of honor. Negative sanctions include informal p enalties such as fear, ridicule, sarcasm and even criticism or formal penalties such as law enforcement, jail sentences, and fines. Conformity and obedience are two areas recognized for studying social control.Conformity means to go along with peers or individuals of our own status with the tendency to change our perceptions, opinions, or behavior in ways that are accepted by the group’s norms. Factors relating to conformity include areas such as size of the group, age differences, gender differences and cultural differences. On the other hand obedience, which is compliance with higher authority, can have an impact on social control as well. Factors relating to obedience include complying with authority figures, the feeling of personal responsibility, and the escalation of harm.With awareness of these factors the more likely someone is to conform along with their peers and obey authority. Sanctions are used to encourage conformity and obedience and are carried out through inf ormal and formal social control. Informal social control is carried out casually by ordinary people to enforce norms through laughter, smile, and ridicule. Formal social control is used to enforce norms through authorized agents such as police officers, judges, school administrators, and employers. Some laws, which are government social control, have been created due to society’s norms being important to people’s behavior.For example the prohibition against murder is a law among every member of society. Whereas fishing and hunting regulations are a law among those specific groups. Our textbook points out that sociologist see the creation of laws as a social process because these laws are not passed from one generation to another, but are evolving from continuous change in society of what is right and what is wrong. Society has accepted and followed these laws not because of peer group or authority figure but by means of belonging or even the fear of being viewed as dif ferent or deviant.In a sense we want to see ourselves and others to see us as loyal, cooperative, and respectful of others. Control theory is a view of conformity and deviance that stresses the social bond between society and individuals. Deviant acts, which violate social norms, may appear attractive to individuals but the social bond is used to help individuals from going toward those attractive deviant acts because of the fear of not belonging. A weak bond between society and an individual may actually push that individual toward a deviant act that he/she can benefit from.As explained by Peter Wickman (2009), â€Å"Deviance is behavior that violates the standards of conduct or expectations of a group or society† (p. 160). There are different degrees of deviance we all experience here in the United States. On one end of the spectrum there are accepted forms of deviance, like being late to a meeting, or texting while driving. On the other end of the spectrum there is crimina l deviance, dog fighting, robbery, and possession of drugs are a few examples. However, the one thing that all deviant behavior has in common is it is all defined within a particular society and at a particular time.Deviant behavior is socially constructed with the people in power defining what is expectable and what is deviant. An example of deviance here in the United States can be found in our freedom of religion. Our society was created with a strong Christian background; attending church on Sundays is widely accepted and practiced among many of our citizens. Conversely, state that you’re a satanic worshiper and you will most definitely carry a social stigma. There are other forms of deviant behavior that people can unwillingly acquire through a social stigma.Being overweight can carry a stigma within our society because overweight people are assumed to be weak in character. Being grossly unattractive can also carry an unwanted social stigma. Social deviance is subject to different social interpretations and varies throughout different cultures. What is considered deviant in one culture may be considered normal in another. Dog fighting is an example of contrasting social deviance between the USA and Afghanistan. Getting caught dog fighting in the United States and you will be thrown in jail and carry a social stigma for the rest of your life.The professional footballer Michael Vick is an example of this negative stigma. Conversely, dog fighting in Afghanistan is widely accepted and practiced every Friday morning (The Scoop, 2002). Oddly enough this was not always the case. When the Taliban was in control there were strict punishments for men who were caught fighting dogs. The Taliban encouraged sports like football, cricket, and martial arts in lieu of dog fighting. This is an example of how deviant behavior can be constructed by the people in power and how deviance can shift from one social era to another.Deviance is a complicated subject. It can b e widely accepted or rejected within a society, and will change over time. Throughout my life I have witnessed many forms of once deviant behavior becoming more and more accepted. I believe there are two primary reasons behind this shift. The first is Colorado Springs becoming a larger more populated city and the second is the mass media. When we think of the sociological perspective on deviance some people don’t even know what deviance means. Everyone has seen some type of deviance in an informal way or formal sense.Society looks at people in a way that everyone should be the same. A person that has a lot of tattoos and piercing would get looked at that they are a bad person just because the way they look. Image, sexual act, and sexual orientation are a few ways that some cultures and people look to define deviance. Functionalist perspective is one key look into deviance. Durkheim focused on the study of crime. He believed that punishment within culture would help define nor mal behavior. The way he looked at things was in a way that he thought things could get fixed.While reading this I believe everyone has their own way to express themselves no matter what culture they were raised in. The look into the functionalist perspective has a lot to do with the perspective of the people and how they look at things. Internactionist perspective explains why rule violations accrue and how people fight from conforming. They state that by not following rules, which are set by certain people, that you are a deviant. There are so many rules out there. Cultural transmission is or stated by the ethnic group or race groups.When you are in school you tend to hang out with your ethic group or race because it’s where you fit in. Like when you see graffiti some people think it is a disgrace to the environment others think of it as art. Like when I look at graffiti I don’t look at it as bad, it’s an art and a talent. We all learn how to act by what socia l groups we are in or what we see. Everyone has their own perspective there is nothing we can do about that. We look at street racers as being deviant because they race. Race car drivers do the same things just in another place other than street.So why do street racers get looked at differently? That doesn’t make sense. Trying to maintain social control is what they try to keep in order. There are main roles in life such as police that try to control or enforce the rules of the world. Then you got teachers, doctors, lawyers, and other court officials that all try to keep the world one way. In this sense they all try to pick out your looks, deviant in their eyes. By social profiling was a way they were trying to pick out who they thought was doing badly. Now looking at sexual deviance or sexual orientation people believe it should be one way and only one way.The way society looks at it as you should be man and women. And sex should only be done one way. Also what is looked at as being sexual crime there are things that some people think that is against sex code such as bondage? They think it is a crime but some people like that. There are so many things in this world that people see as deviant but really isn’t. Conflict theory defines how there are lawsuits against or towards gambling, drugs and etc. Some cultures look at gambling as a past time but the law looks at it being bad. Why should the way we were raised or how we were brought up by against us.The justice system is and will always judge against us. While looking and reading on deviants everyone is deviant in some way, shape or form. I know that I am looked at as being deviant. There are many out there that will always judge. Also by reading this opens my eyes to how things really work. Why should there be social norms on society. This is all on the perspective view of others. In Sociology, crime is identified as a deviant behavior. It is deviant in that it goes against accepted or written rules and laws that guide a society.To understand crime and sociology, one must first understand the â€Å"Conflict Theory† founded by Karl Marx. Conflict theory sees society as two struggling groups engaged in conflict over resources. Under this theory, it is believed that the capitalist class (or the society elites) commits acts of deviance just as the working class does. The main difference is that society elites determine the rules regarding what is deviant. This difference among the people will always lead to conflict. This idea explains why there is crime in societies and why it will never cease to be.Sociologists classify crimes by three types: crimes against a person, crimes against property, and victimless crimes. Crimes against a person include any offenses where violence is used or threatened. Mugging and assault are examples of crimes against a person. Crimes against property include theft of property or damage done to someone else's property. Burglary and arson are crimes against property. Finally, victimless crimes are crimes that are against the law, but no victim exists. Prostitution and marijuana are common examples of victimless crimes. In sociology, all crimes fall into one of these three categories.A victimless crime is a term used to refer to actions that have been ruled illegal but do not directly violate or threaten the rights of another individual. It often involves consensual acts in which two or more persons agree to commit a criminal offence in which no other person is involved. For example, in the United States current victimless crimes include prostitution, gambling, and illicit drug use. The term â€Å"victimless crime† is not used in jurisprudence, but is used to cast doubt onto the efficacy of existing and proposed legislation; or to highlight the unintended consequences of the same.In politics, for example, a lobbyist might use this word with the implication that the law in question should be abolished. Victimles s crimes are not always so weighty. Some examples of low level victimless activities that may be criminalized include: * individual purchase and consumption of recreational drugs (provided one does not hurt anyone else due to the effects) * prostitution and/or soliciting for prostitution * public nudity or fornication * the consumption of pornography Crimes committed by persons for whom criminally punishable acts are a permanent occupation and the primary source of money.Persons who engage in professional crime have the skills and means necessary for criminal activity and specialize in some particular type of crime, such as theft or buying and selling of stolen goods. Professional crime has its own psychology and customs, but many times professional crimes tie in with organized crime. Organized crime is transnational, national, or local groupings of highly centralized enterprises run by criminals for the purpose of engaging in illegal activity, most commonly for monetary profit.Some times criminal organizations force people to do business with them, as when a gang extorts money from shopkeepers for â€Å"protection†. Gangs may become â€Å"disciplined† enough to be considered â€Å"organized†. An organized gang or criminal set can also be referred to as a mob. In the United States the Organized Crime Control Act (1970) defines organized crime as â€Å"The unlawful activities of a highly organized, disciplined association†. Criminal activity as a structured group is referred to as racketeering and such crime is commonly referred to as the work of the Mob.In addition, due to the escalating violence of Mexico's drug war, the Mexican drug cartels are considered the ‘greatest organized crime threat to the United States', according to a report issued by the United States Department of Justice. White-collar crime is a financially motivated, non-violent crime committed for monetary gain. Within the field of criminology, white-collar cr ime initially was defined by Edwin Sutherland in 1939 as â€Å"a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation† (1939).Sutherland was a proponent of Symbolic Interactionism, and believed that criminal behavior was learned from interpersonal interaction with others. The term white-collar crime only dates back to 1939. Professor Edwin Hardin Sutherland was the first to coin the term, and hypothesize white-collar criminals attributed different characteristics and motives than typical street criminals. Sutherland defined his idea as â€Å"crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation. The introduction of white-collar crime was a relatively new issue to criminology at that time.He was urging other criminologists to stop focusing on the socially and economically disadvantaged. The types of individuals who committed these crimes lived successfully and were respected by soci ety in general-also criminologists; because these criminals were held to such a high regard, these individuals were given a blind eye to the crimes they committed. Our group choose this chapter ‘Deviance and Social Control’ to share with you all today, because we feel everyone can relate to the sociologists’ perspective regarding social control, deviance, and crime.We have learned law and society play an important role in social control, deviant acts to one person may in fact be part of another person’s culture, and crime has many different categories such as victimless crime, professional crime, and organized crime that all have formal penalties that are enforce by governmental authority. References * http://willapse. hubpages. com/hub/Thailand-Health–Safety-and-Risks-2-Crime * http://encyclopedia2. thefreedictionary. com/Professional+Crime * Attenborough, F. L. ed. and trans. ) (1922). The Laws of the Earliest English Kings. Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity Press. Reprint March 2006. The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. ISBN 1-58477-583-1 * Schaefer, R. T. (2009). Sociology: A Brief Introduction. (8th ed. Pp. 160-163). New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education. * One good reason why dogs miss the Taliban. (2002), The Scoop. Canine Nation. Retrieved from http://dogsinthenews. com/issues/0201/articles/020124a. htm * http://www. youtube. com/watch? v=GHuI2JIPylk&feature=related

Analysis of Erik, Phantom of the Opera Using Two Contrasting Personality Theories

The tremendously popular and well-known Andrew Lloyd Webber’s 1986 musical production of The Phantom of the Opera was based on the French novel Le Fantome de l'Opera written by Gaston Leroux in1910 (Leroux, 1910/1990). The original novel gave little direct details with respect to Erik’s past; what was abundant however were hints and implications about the character’s life history throughout the book (Leroux, 1910/1990).Erik was actually not his birth name but rather a name given to him by accident, and Leroux had simply called him â€Å"the man’s voice† in the novel; Erik, however, had referred himself as â€Å"the opera ghost† and â€Å"the angel of music† throughout the texts (Leroux, 1910/1990). The history of Erik was revealed in the novel mostly by the character Persia (also known as the Persian or the daroga), a local police chief in Persia that followed Erik to Paris.The character Erik will be described below based on the transl ated work of Leroux (1910/1990), followed by an analysis of his personality using concepts derived from (1) the Freudian theory of psychoanalysis, and (2) the Skinnerian radical behaviorism concept. These two theorists were chosen because they represent polar opposites on how personality is viewed. While Freud maintained that the unconscious is the underlying driving force from which personality develops, Skinner rejected all non-observable parameters such as thoughts, feelings, emotions, and the unconscious in his scientific analysis of human behavior.Freud’s emphasis on personality development was on the continuous struggle between the id and the superego, and how successfully the ego can manage a healthy balance between them. Freud also determined 5 psychosexual stages that must be negotiated and satisfied during childhood development, failure on doing so will result in aberrant personality traits. Skinner, however, believed that all behavior, and hence personality, are le arned as a function of environmental factors.A behavior that is reinforced will likely to be repeated, one that is punished will most likely not. He maintained that genetic predispositions allow humans to react to stimuli within a certain range, and where within that range our behavior falls is determined by how we are shaped by the influence of the environment we find ourselves. In this paper, the major differences in how those two theorists might interpret Erik’s personality will be discussed. The Character Erik Erik was born in a small town on the outskirts of Rouen, France.Hideously deformed at birth, his mother was horrified by his appearance and his father refused to even look at him. Tortured by ridicules and spite from his own mother, he ran away as a young boy and was adopted by a band of travelling Gypsies. He earned his living by performing in freak shows, where he was labeled as the living death. Despite his monstrous appearance, Erik was an extremely talented ind ividual. In addition to possessing a most eerie and supernatural singing voice, he gained great skills as an illusionist, magician, and ventriloquist.A fur trader recognized Erik’s gifted abilities and mentioned it to the Shah of Persia, who then ordered to have him brought to his palace. Erik soon proved to the Shah his knowledge in architecture, and the Shah commissioned him to design and build Mazenderan, an elaborate palace full of trap doors, hidden passages, and secret rooms such that no one could be certain of his/her privacy: someone would be listening or spying at anytime and anywhere. The Shah could practically vanish from a room in an instant and reappear elsewhere in utter secrecy.During Erik’s tenure with the Shah, he was also employed as a political assassin, carrying out the Shah’s orders by strangling his victims using an unique noose known as the Punjab Lasso. Pleased with his work but determined that no other such palaces should be built and ow ned by anyone else (not to mention Erik and his workers were the only ones that had intimate knowledge of the palace’s layout), the Shah first ordered Erik and his workers be blinded but then realized he could build another one even without his eyesight, ordered their executions.By the intervention of the local police chief (the Persian), Erik escaped to Constantinople and was employed by its’ ruling Sultan to build his grand palace of a similar design. Alas, he was later forced to escape Constantinople for the same reason he fled Persia. Erik’s next destination was most likely to be somewhere in Southeast Asia, where he decided that he was tired of his nomadic lifestyle. Eventually, he returned to Paris and successfully bided on a contract to help build the Paris Opera. Using his extensive experiences from the past, the theater was built withtrap doors and secret passageways throughout. In addition, Erik built himself a palace, or a playhouse, of a sort deep wi thin the cellar of the opera house so that he did not have to live amongst the cruelty of humankind. He spent the next 20 years or so in his â€Å"home† writing and composing music of various sorts. At about the same time, a beautiful and technically talented chorus girl by the name of Christine Daae, who had lost all passion to sing and perform due to her father’s passing, somehow heard Erik’s singing and music in her dressing room at late nights.Thinking that must have been an â€Å"angel† sent by her father, Christine took singing lessons from the â€Å"Angel of Music† during the nights and later emerged as a virtuoso singer better than she ever was. By now, Erik was secretly in love with Christine, and one night he revealed himself to her from behind a mirror in her dressing room, wearing a mask, and led her through the mazes and labyrinths into his domain in the cellar of the theater.It turned out that Erik had been composing his masterpiece f or the last 20 years, and realizing his genius, Christine asked if he would play a part from the masterpiece for her, and Erik refused as the piece was yet incomplete. Erik’s original plan upon the completion of his masterpiece was to go to his bed, which was in fact a coffin, and fall into an eternal sleep. Feeling the obvious pain from Erik and yearning to see his face, Christine ripped the mask off, and saw the horrible disfigurement. Another person vying for Christine’s affection was the Vicomte Raoul de Chagney.A childhood friend of Christine, he was captivated by her new-found voice, so unearthly passionate that led Raoul to fall madly in love with her. In the final chapters of Leroux’s novel, Erik kidnapped Christine straight from the stage during one of the performances, showed her the completed masterpiece, and asked her to marry him instead of the Vicomte so that the two of them can live a happy life, rather than him simply slip way into his â€Å"bed † and dies. If she were to refuse, however, Erik would detonate the massive amount of gun powder he had secretly accumulated under the opera house over the years.Christine submitted to his request in order to save herself, unknowing Raoul had fallen accidentally into Erik’s torture chamber while searching the opera house for her with the help of the Persian and the opera house staffs. Acknowledging her acceptance, Erik gave Christine a gold ring and kissed her cheek. He was so overwhelmed with joy that he fell to his knees and cried uncontrollably. Seeing the genius with a tortured soul finding happiness at last, Christine cried with Erik. Erik then surprised Christine by saying that he is now willing to let her go, and she was free to marry Raoul.Erik freed Raoul and let them both leave the dungeon, but not before making Christine promise to come back and bury him upon his death. Christine kissed Erik on his forehead, and disappeared into the night with Raoul. Carrying his most cherished possession, the diary kept by Christine detailing everything that had happened between them, Erik went to the Persian and told him the whole story, with the hand-written diary as proof. Erik died three weeks afterwards. Christine kept her promise and returned to the opera house, but before the burial, she slipped the gold ring Erik had given to her three weeks earlier onto his finger.Sigmund Freud’s Psychoanalytic Approach to Erik’s Personality The core concept of psychoanalysis developed by Sigmund Freud (1856 – 1939) is the significant influence the unconscious mind has on the conscious (Burkitt, 2010; Freud, 1923/1990). The unconscious is a vast reservoir of latent thoughts and memories (real, repressed, or false) that are not associated with the activities of the conscious mind, but those activities consciously executed are in fact directed and driven by the unconscious (Burkitt, 2010; Freud, 1923/1990).In the novel, Erik was able to util ize this power of the unconscious to strategically place himself in the mind of Christine, letting her to believe that he was sent by her deceased father and thus masquerading as the â€Å"Angel of Music†. According to Freud, the oral stage is the first stage of psychosexual development (Freud, 1923/1990; van Beekum, 2009). In addition to providing nourishment, the mother’s breasts provide a source of love, pleasure, and security to the infant (Freud, 1923/1990; Wagg & Pridmore, 2004).Weaning would therefore create a stressful situation for the infant: giving up the comfort feelings the mother’s breasts have provided. Some infants are easier than others to succeed in negotiating and resolving this conflict between the id and the ego (Freud, 1923/1990; van Beekum, 2009) by redirecting their psychosexual energy (libido) toward other challenges. For those infants that do not, the psychosexual development theory affirms they will develop into orally fixated adults ( Freud, 1923/1990; van Beekum, 2009; Wagg & Pridmore, 2004).Although it was not detailed in the novel, Erik most likely was never breast-fed as his mother loathed his appearance and his father refused to even look at him. It is therefore reasonable to assume that as an adult, Erik would have an extreme case of oral fixation, constantly seeking for the pleasure and comfort that would have been derived from oral stimulations denied during infancy. In theory, adult manifestations of oral-stage fixation include nail-biting, eating, chewing, smoking, and alcoholism (Wagg & Pridmore, 2004).Similarly, they may derive psychological pleasure from talking and constantly seeking knowledge (Wagg & Pridmore, 2004). Although Leroux did not detail Erik’s personal habits, we can certainly see that he was constantly looking for and acquiring knowledge and skills, being an accomplished magician and ventriloquist, a brilliant architect and master builder, a royal assassin, a music genius with a most haunting, unearthly, yet passionate voice (Leroux, 1910/1990).Instead of talking, Erik’s obsession with oral stimulation was manifested as singing: singing to himself, hoping to seek solace throughout his life; and later to Christine as well as giving her vocal lessons. It therefore appears to me that the desirable, pleasurable substance he chose to keep in his mouth was music in the form of his own voice. The first, and most psychoanalysts would argue to also be the most important, ego defense mechanism identified by Freud was what he called repression: threatening thoughts and ideas are repressed, or pushed back into the unconscious (Freud, 1923/1990; Rosenzweig, 1943; Wagg & Pridmore, 2004).Repression can therefore be viewed as a barrier used by the conscious mind to block out specific (usually painful, unpleasant, or inappropriate) thoughts arising from the unconscious. In the phallic stage (around age 4 years) during which a child’s sexual energy is focused o n the genitals, the aggressive thoughts in the Oedipus complex about the same sex parents are learned to be repressed (but must be resolved later) by the developing boy (Adler, 2010; Rosenzweig, 1943; Wagg & Pridmore, 2004). One of those feelings the boy represses is the fear of castration, which will be discussed below.Base on a Greek legend in which Oedipus, the Thebes king who unknowingly killed his father and married his mother, the term â€Å"Oedipus complex† was used by Freud to describe a boy’s sexual desires toward his mother and rivalries toward his father (Adler, 2010; van Beekum, 2009). Freud theorized that such thoughts and feelings and the psychological defenses against such thoughts and feelings are of critical importance in personality development as they will become the fundamental reaction pattern the individual relies on throughout life (Adler, 2010; van Beekum, 2009).Freud noted that during this phallic stage when children begin to explore their geni tals – boys with their penises, at the same time they are also concerned with their fathers’ penises and girls who do not have them. Freud theorized that while the boy is struggling with his intense sexual desire toward his mother, he must have also realized that he does not have the physical strength to overpower his father; he fears the father may castrate him as an act of revenge, leaving him without a penis and therefore resembling a girl – Freud termed this unconscious fear â€Å"castration anxiety† (Adler, 2010; van Beekum, 2009).In order to resolve this conflict successfully, the developing boy pledges allegiance to his father. He tries to become a person like his father, and by assuming his characteristics, the boy replaces his father to become the authoritative, father-of-the-household figure and so, by extension, achieves sexual relations with his mother while diminishing the fear of being castrated (Adler, 2010; van Beekum, 2009).In Erikâ€℠¢s case, I believe his total alienation from his family as well as the society at-large led to a totally unresolved Oedipus complex: he felt no love for his mother, he did not know his father at all, and therefore no parent to identify with. Failing to identify himself with one parent, Erik therefore was incapable of moral internalization. He did whatever made him feel good at the time; he neither feared nor knew punishment because it did not matter what he does or does not do, the results were inevitably the same.In other words, his repressive defense mechanism, neither learned nor developed in childhood, was practically non-existent. Having no basic repressive skills and thus letting the thanatos force of the id to freely and repeatedly surface to the conscious and gratified, it is no wonder why Erik experienced frequent negative emotional outbursts, lack of remorse as an assassin, and an irrational, maniacal fixation on whatever he wished for, specifically, Christine. In addition , his obsession with Christine may be a way Erik dealt with impulses that he knew was unacceptable even to himself.I believe he unconsciously identified himself with Christine, both talented and tormented but with the exception of her being accepted publically and he loathed. Because he could never be accepted by the public regardless of how talented he was, teaching Christine all he knew and thus controlling her may be a way Erik thought he could live his imaginary â€Å"good life† through her success. By allowing Erik to kiss her on her cheek, a pivotal moment in the novel was created as Christine appeared to have melted his cold heart.Although Maslow’s self-actualization theory may view Erik’s reaction as a peak experience, I do not believe that to be the case. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs placed self-actualization on the very top of the ladder and can only be achieved after all other needs, physiological, safety, belongingness and love, and esteem, are satisfied (Hanley & Abell, 2002). Clearly, none of Erik’s life needs were even close to being satisfied, and therefore the innate process of self-actualization (Hanley & Abell, 2002) must have been foreign to him.I believe Erik’s reaction was another manifestation of the uncontrolled id surfacing to the conscious. This time, however, it was the eros force of the id that surfaced. This tremendous emotional release of positive energy, or catharsis, was so foreign yet comforting to him that he b roke down and cried uncontrollably. This was most likely the very first time the eros and not the thanatos force of his id was gratified as he was so accustomed to in his life up to that very moment; he finally felt the positive aspect of what it is to be human.The sensation of having the eros drive satisfied was so much more pleasurable than having the thanatos drive satisfied, his ego decide to choose to release Raoul and free Christine, allowing them to be married. B. F. Skinn er’s Radical Behaviorism Approach to Erik’s Personality In stark contrast to personality theorist such as Freud and Jung, Burrhus Frederick Skinner (1904 – 1990) viewed personality as a result of previous history of reinforcement (such as rewards and punishments) and that personality is determined and controlled by environmental factors (Moore, 2011).Therefore, in order to understand the behavior of a person, we must first uncover the set of environmental conditions where the behavior is exhibited. Skinner reasoned that in the presence of a discriminative stimulus, a characteristic response is elicited (Moore, 2011). Depending on how the response is reinforced, the behavior of the individual toward that discriminative stimulus is gradually shaped (Moore, 2011). In his principles of operant conditioning, Skinner emphasized how behavior can be changed by manipulating the reinforcing consequence (Moore, 2011).Skinner strongly rejected mentalism; terms such as perso nality, psychical structures (Freud’s id, ego, and superego), needs, and instinct were of no meanings to Skinner and instead, he favored the directly observable behaviors and emphasized on the function of the behavior in his research (Moore, 2011). According to Skinner, there is no free will (Moore, 2011). In Skinner’s view, what we see as personality is basically a group of responses to the environment, and if the responses are rewarded, then they are more likely to be repeated.Freud viewed the id as the instinctual driving force from the undifferentiated core of personality while Skinner asserted that what we see as a driving force is really humans’ innate susceptibility to reinforcement (Moore, 2011). Rather than seeing the ego as how humans respond to the world according to the reality principle, Skinner reasoned that all responses are learned, and different behavior will be exhibited by an individual under different circumstances.Refuting the Freudian conce pt of the superego as a set of internalized social rules and values that guide the ego in the continual struggle and negotiation with the id, Skinner believed that behavior is learned from how the society punishes such behavior: we simply control those behaviors that are not allowed by the society – exhibiting such behaviors will lead to unpleasant consequences. Therefore, Skinner interpreted the Freudian ego defense mechanism as avoidance to conditioned aversive stimulations, or punishments (Moore, 2011).In terms of genetic predispositions, Skinner suggests that genes (biological factors) provide an individual a range of response capabilities, but it is the environment that selects for the type of response that best suits the individual’s survival. Skinner also did not deny the existence of internal processes such as emotions and thoughts; he viewed them as individual characteristics caused by the environment and as such they are irrelevant in the explanation and the understanding of behavior (Moore, 2011).Erik appeared to have been genetically gifted with an extremely wide range of response capabilities as well as a talent in knowledge acquisition. Born grotesquely deformed, the environmental factor that selected him came in the form of a band of wondering Gypsies. Exploiting his deformity for monetary gain, they actually provided Eric a chance to survive into adulthood. Because he was gifted as a learner, he mastered the Gypsies’ many different performing skills and incorporated them into his own routines, further securing his acceptance within the band – the members could reliably depend on him as a money maker.His childhood experience thus far conditioned him to be independent: He could not depend on his family because he was a disgrace to them, he had no friends, and the band of Gypsies took pity on him for the sole reason of being able to make money off him. The more he enriched himself, the more valuable he was to the compan y. The reinforcing consequence was shelter and food, and his learned response to the environment was therefore to learn as much skill as he could and to become as selfish as he could.To Erik, it was every man on his own and for his own. Erik would not have any problem in being an assassin. Within the Shah’s realm, killing as directed by the Shah was rewarded. In addition, I believe that it is more than likely that Erik viewed â€Å"punishment† as normal, and hence his interpretation of â€Å"punishment† was not as an aversive stimulation, but rather normalcy. He therefore had no fear of being â€Å"punished† for being a killer and at the same time, successful killings were repeatedly reinforced with wealth and status.This changed, however, when Christine entered the picture. Erik developed an obsession toward the beautiful, talented, but emotionally devastated (due to the death of her father) chorus girl. Behaviorist view obsession as random acts that are by chance reinforced (Moore, 2011). Christine was fascinated with his genius, and thought that he was an angel sent by her father. Having not seen his disfigurement, I believe Christine did love Erik before that revelation. She respected Erik for his talent, and curiousenough to learn more about this â€Å"Angel of Music†. Erik no doubt was first captivated by her beauty, and when they actually spoke, Erik must have been pleasantly surprised that, for the first time in his life, he was treated as a person with no ill side-effects. These encounters-in-the-shadow made Erik feel good about himself, and together with a lack of negative consequences, he became obsessed with her – having a â€Å"relationship† with Christine made him happy, easing the anxiety within.Under Skinner’s concept of operant conditioning (operant because, in Erik’s case, he did not expect to be reinforced with kindness), I would think that by changing the environment from greed, hate, treachery, and death to that of kindness and warmth provided by the presence of Christine, Erik was able to radically change his behavior from total selfishness, oblivious to the needs of others to one that was more or less compassionate. This radical change, however, did not come overnight.It was through multiple encounters with Christine, each time they learn more about each other, each time his action was reinforced by the increasing level of kindness and respect returned to him, that his behavior was shaped. Erik did not know love, compassion, kindness, or any other behavior that we associate as positive, and clearly those behaviors were not instinctual to him. With Christine, he was being rewarded for â€Å"being good† – a teacher, a nurturing figure, or even, a lover.The need to possess Christine solely for himself, however, proved to be overwhelming. Brief liaisons in the shadows, no matter how frequent, were no longer satisfying. He needed the environmen t created by the presence of Christine all the time. Simply put, Erik had learned to become an addict; he was addicted to Christine. Behaviorists view love as a stimulus that elicits a range of responses (Moore, 2011; Tolman, 1923). Upon experiencing the love stimulus, infants and toddlers may respond by stop crying, smiling, cooing, etc.and the outstretching and flaying of their arms may be interpreted as wanting more of the stimulus (Moore, 2011; Tolman, 1923). Erik never experienced love and yet he felt pleasure from the stimulus. Unlike unpleasant stimuli such as fear and anger that one reacts by removing oneself away from the hostile environment, Erik needed to remain in the environment that gave him pleasure. In order to do so, he must have Christine in order to create an environment that continuously provides him with that stimulus, love.Most likely triggered by seeing her perform on stage that night, Erik resorted to the familiar solution in obtaining reward quickly and easi ly: he kidnapped her, threatened her with her very life if his addiction was not satiated. However, the environment where Christine is present may prove to be the key in his ultimate decision to free her. Skinner viewed that all behaviors are controlled by the environment, and I believe we are seeing this concept consolidate in Erik’s decision. In the presence of Christine, Erik was compassionate, accommodating, and aware of the turmoil within himself and Christine.I believe that in the environment created by her presence, he saw the impracticality and impossibility in the hope of spending the rest of his life with her. Letting her free was the choice he made in order to make Christine happy, for giving her this happiness would be his own greatest reward. Summary In this essay, the personality characteristics of Erik, Phantom of the Opera, were discussed using the Freudian psychoanalytic approach and the opposing Skinnerian radical behaviorism as references.The Freudian appro ach would suggest that Erik’s personality was a manifestation of his unconscious, orally fixated psychosexual development and an unresolved Oedipus complex with no repressive ego defense mechanism. Erik’s life had been devoted to the satisfaction of the thanatos, the id driving force that leads toward aggression, destruction, and death. Without any internalized social rules and values (superego) as a guide to his actions, his ego had very little to resolve between the id and the superego.As such, the id, driven by the thanatos force, repeatedly surface to the conscious and thus repeatedly gratified. The Skinnerian approach would view Erik’s personality as shaped by previous history of reinforcement in his given environment, steadily and progressively as he developed from a severely deformed, ridiculed child to a highly talented but tormented adult with little conscience. Everything that made up the person Erik was learned, and he had no free will to choose other wise. Through operant conditioning, Erik learned to be ruthless, selfish, and hateful.A behaviorist may interpret Erik’s need to possess Christine as a conditioned need for a stimulus, an addiction, and the respect and kindness returned to him by Christine functioned as reinfocers. In total disparity to his personality, the pivotal moment of the story came when Erik chose to let Christine and Raoul free. A Freudian psychoanalyst may interpret this as his unconscious need to re-experience the pleasure he felt when he first unleashed the id eros force when Christine allowed him to kiss her on the cheek, a pleasure far surpassing what a gratified id thanatos force was able to offer him up to that point.Radical behaviorism may view Erik’s decision in releasing Christine and Raoul was environmentally influenced. First in the presence of Christine’s voice alone and later with her physical presence repeatedly created an environment that was pleasurable to Erik – he was rewarded and reinforced with respect and human kindness. In that environment, he behaved compassionately – making Christine happy gave him pleasure in return. It would make her happiest with Raoul, and so the decision to free them was made. These two opposing theories provided very different explanations to Erik’s personality.However, I believe elements from both theories may be combined for a more comprehensive analysis on his behavior. It is very likely that Erik’s behaviors were learned and shaped by the hostile environment he constantly found himself since birth. Those behaviors, however inappropriate from a â€Å"normal† person’s point of view, were none-the-less necessary in ensuring his survival. The other aspect of his personality was his unconscious need for love and human kindness, something that he knew not existed until he encountered Christine.This is the turning point for Erik’s personality development and likely to be the first battle between the thanatos drive that he was so accustomed to and the newly surfaced eros drive that his ego now must resolve. At the end, it was the eros force that predominated. Behaviorists would interpret that his act of compassion was defined by the environment with the presence of Christine; in her presence, Erik was able to explore the positive aspects of human behavior, ultimately realizing that he too possessed those qualities all along, just that they were, as Freud would put it, hidden in the unconscious.

Investigation of the causes of failure of Lehman Brothers with special Dissertation

Investigation of the causes of failure of Lehman Brothers with special reference to agency problems - Dissertation Example This research study mainly focuses on answering the question related to possible agency problems that were instrumental in the failure of Lehman Brothers. It also evaluates other possible reasons of its failure. The research study was conducted through a literature review and the case study research method. The report relies primarily on secondary research, making use of the existing literature from various articles, journals, and newspapers. The findings of this study suggested that agency problems played a significant the fallout of Lehman Brothers with the company managers involved in taking several risky investment decisions, less on behalf of the owners of the company and more in the interests of top management. The high amount of incentive compensations offered to the top executives encouraged them to resort to such business strategies. Apart from the failure of risk management control within the company, its complex organisational structure and the adverse impact of global financial crisis also played a role in the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This research study can thus be helpful in conducting further research on agency problems that can arise in other business organisations worldwide. It can be helpful for companies to develop various means to overcome such problems, leading to more sustainable and less risky growth and development. Table of Contents Tables and Figures 2 Chapter I: Introduction 3 1.1Rationale of the Study 5 1.2Aims and Objectives of the Study 6 1.3Research Questions 6 Chapter II: Literature Review 7 2.1 Subprime Crisis 7 2.2 Agency Theory 8 2.3 Agency Problems 9 2.3.1 Contracts 11 2.3.2 Incentive Contracts 12 2.3.3 Management Discretion 13 2.3.4 Evidences Related to Agency Costs 13 2.4 Causes of Failure of Lehman Brothers 14 2.4.1 Complex Organisational Structure 16 2.4.2 Valuation Issues 17 2.4.3 Risk Management Issues 17 2.4.4 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 18 Chapter III: Research Methodology 19 3.1 Type of Research Method 19 3.2 Data Sources 19 3.3 Case Study Research 19 3.5 Research Design 20 3.5.1 Construct Validity 20 3.5.2 Internal Validity 21 3.5.3 External Validity 21 3.5.4 Reliability 22 Chapter IV: Findings and Analysis 22 4.1 Secondary Research Findings 22 4.1.1 Lehman Brothers and its Organisational Structure 22 4.1.2 Lehman Brothers’ Financials 23 4.1.3 Executive Compensations 24 4.2 Findings 25 4.3 Analysis and Discussions 25 Chapter V: Conclusion 26 Works Cited 28 Tables and Figures Figure 1.1 24 Figure 1.2 25 Chapter I: Introduction The financial industry worldwide experienced a great shock with the event of the bankruptcy filing by Lehman Brothers on 15 September, 2008. It is considered to be one of the largest filing of bankruptcy by any organization in United States. This significant incident occurred in the midst of

Ontogenetic change in skull morphology and Mechanical Advantage in the Essay

Ontogenetic change in skull morphology and Mechanical Advantage in the Spotted Hyena (Crocutacrocuta) - Essay Example Adult spotted hyena have durophagy adaptations that include large jaw, adductor muscles, simplified and robust dentition, and pronounced sagittal crest. Feeding of weaning hyena was limited by morphology compared to adult resulting from the study of ontogenetic change in the skull and feed apparatus. The study is, therefore, aimed at establishing as whether feeding of young hyena was limited by the skull shape, skull size, and the mechanical advantage of jaw muscles. The study also seeks to enquire if feeding apparatus is slow in the spotted hyena compared with other carnivores not adapted for durophagy. Various materials and methods were employed during the study. For instant, during sampling, ontogenic series of individuals of age ranging from 2 months to 18 years of 68 spotted hyenas we sampled. Most of the samples were from the southwest of Kenya in Masai Mara Reserve. Their age was estimated depending upon the appearance. On the other hand, to quantify skull changes, ‘2D landmark-based geometric morphometrics was used. Three views of the skull were analyzed that involved lateral cranium, lateral mandibles, and ventral cranium. In the analysis of fused lateral mandible and cranium for adult hyenas, semi-landmarks were used which later digitized by use of ‘tpsDig’. In addition, superimposition was used to remove variations (Holekamp, Lundrigan, Tanner and Zelditch 354). The analysis of change in ontogenetic shape was done as well as analyzing the relationship between shape and size over a given period (Holekamp, Lundrigan, Tanner and Zelditch 355). The ontogenetic trajectories were determined if they differed significantly. As a result, the sample sizes obtained from a pair of bootstrap used varied with ages. On the other hand, size of the muscle and mechanical advantage was determined first using traditional methods. For instant, size of the adductor muscle was estimated across the zygomatic arches by maximum width. The mechanical advantage was